One recurring feature in efforts to break patterns of conflict and to install stable and durable peace settlements has been the role played by outside powers. External states may assist not just by underwriting security arrangements but also by forming part of a mechanism that is available to intervene at critical moments (Hartzell et al., 2001: 191-3). Of course, such intervention need not be disinterested. Analysis of external intervention in ethnic conflicts in a range of African cases led two researchers to conclude that Outside parties are most likely to intervene in ethnicized conflicts when their own national interests can be advanced. Selfless commitment to the international mediation of such conflicts, no matter how horrific they may be, remains a rare occurrence in contemporary international politics (Taras and Ganguly, 2010: 239).
Breaking patterns of conflict in Northern Ireland: new perspectives

John Coakley and Jennifer Todd
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The huge variety of geopolitical contexts within which ethnic conflicts run their course can see neighbouring states play a range of different roles. Here we consider the special (but by no means unique) case where the conflict is located in a region of one state over which a neighbouring state has had a territorial claim, itself part of the legacy of a quasi-colonial relationship: Northern Ireland. Much analysis of conflict and settlement in Northern Ireland has put the spotlight on actors -populations, paramilitaries, parties and prime ministers. Less attention has been paid to the level of the state: the British state, whose writ of course extends over Northern Ireland, but also the Irish state, which surrendered a strong formal but ineffective claim to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland for the reality of a significant voice in its political future.
This special issue focuses on the changes in state frameworks, laws and practices that accompanied, facilitated and encouraged the process of settlement which led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and the later transformation of institutions and political relations in Northern Ireland and in these islands more generally. It explores the interrelations of different levels of state and institutional change. These range from the broadest concepts of sovereignty and ideology to the actual impact of large changes on particular institutions and laws. They also extend over elite political assumptions and strategies, and inter-state coordination practices. In this introductory article, we review the broad field that the special issue addresses, we indicate how it is tackled in the articles that follow, we discuss the data sources that are available to support this analysis, and we describe in greater detail the output of a major collection of oral material on which most of the these articles draw.
Governments and conflict resolution
Central to reaching peace and settlement in Northern Ireland was a set of British-Irish intergovernmental discussions and negotiations, dating from the beginning of the 1980s. By the mid-1990s the two governments, in close if informal contact with the parties in Northern Ireland, had devised the principles on which settlement would be based (the Downing Street Declaration of 1993), and had provided a sketch of the institutional framework of settlement (the Frameworks Documents of 1995). These formed the basis of multi-party negotiations convened in 1996 and joined by Sinn Féin in September 1997, after an IRA ceasefire the previous July.
1 The negotiation process was internationally chaired and government-led. Negotiations proceeded through bilateral sessions -for example, between the Irish government and unionists on constitutional issues -with the governments moving between the parties.
The minor parties, and sometimes even the major ones, often felt shoe-horned into an agreement drafted and redrafted by British and Irish civil servants (Todd, 2003, 10) How are we to understand the role of the two governments in the longer process that led from the outbreak of conflict through settlement to implementation? Were they honest brokers, mediators or actors in the conflict? The question became central to debate in the 1990s (Wright, 1987; Guelke, 1988; Whyte, 1990; McGarry and O'Leary, 1995; Ruane and Todd, 1996) , just as the governments themselves were taking an active role in conflict-resolution.
Once settlement was achieved in 1998, academic attention moved on. The British and Irish states and their interrelations remained the subject of historical analysis (Cunningham, 2001; O'Kane, 2007; Smith, 2011; Aughey and Gormley Heenan 2011, Patterson, 2013) and of analysis that ranged much more widely than Northern Ireland itself (Arthur, 2000; Cox et al, 2006 ; Coakley et al, 2005) . The most lively debates, however, concerned other issues:
analyses of the newly designed consociational institutions O'Leary, 2004: Taylor, 2009 ); monitoring of the workings of the devolved and cross-border institutions (Carmichael and Knox, 2007; Wilford, 2012 ) ; the political dramas and contests within unionism, nationalism and republicanism, and among the (ex)-paramilitaries (Shirlow et al (2010) ; McAuley et al, 2011) ; and the multiple aspects of the peace and settlement process (Hennessey, 2000; Irwin, 2002; Tonge, 2005; Ashe, 2007 McEvoy et al, 2007 . (McKittrick et al, 2004 Smithey, 2011) The are willing or able to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about stillcontentious events in which they played a part. Elite narratives often point us towards new facts, but need always to be corroborated. But they are invaluable in revealing not just facts but perspectives and modes of understanding. These differ over time, and Irish and British perspectives often conflict strongly. In sifting through these complex and often mutually contradictory reflections, scholars need conceptual toolkits that can synthesise the varying perspectives within a coherent framework of meaning.
Theoretical models are central in description and explanation of the key events in Northern
Ireland, not because of the paucity of evidence but because of its often contradictory character and the highly politicised nature of many interpretations. It is here that the articles in this volume break important ground in interpretation and explanation. If they use interview material as supplementary or primary data sources, they are far from simple reports of elite narratives but rather analytical reflections on those narratives, The authors use different theoretical tool-kits -complex interdependence, the contact hypothesis, theories of sovereignty and federalism, models of structural change -to tease out important facets of change, continuity and causality. They do not simply apply theory but adapt it while sifting through the data, deploying the empirical research to clarify the general concepts, using the concepts to guide interpretation of the data, and coming to a reflective equilibrium between theory and data in an iterative process (Bates et al, 1998: 16) . The resulting 'analytic narratives' are to be judged against the known facts, by their coherence and by measuring them against competing interpretations (Bates et al, 1998: 14-18 This volume focuses on the British and Irish states, the modes of cooperation between them, and their contribution, singly and jointly, to settlement in Northern Ireland and to ongoing processes of change. For a period, it seemed that the wider processes of British-Irish cooperation in the face of economic crisis would take precedence over Northern Irish affairs. Yet the winter of 2012-13 showed that the settlement process in Northern Ireland is far from complete. Diffuse discontent and a general sense of exclusion on the part of loyalists have been long simmering. Whether these can be absorbed and handled by the existing structure, or constitute a sign of a deeper failure to resolve rather than manage longer-term conflicts of interest and social divisions, is a question for another volume. It is, however, clear that in whatever way we conceptualise the states' roles, we should not assume that the narrative has ended.
Dimensions of conflict resolution
Given this focus on the state, the special issue begins with a set of four articles that stand The position of Scotland within the UK highlights the complex concept of sovereignty, the subject of Elizabeth Meehan's article. Lacking a written constitution, or at least a codified one, the UK has relied on piece-meal, pragmatic responses to changing political demands, including ones with profound implications for the structure of the state. Paradoxically, the notion of parliament as sovereign can survive ambitious experiments in devolution. While in constitutional theory such experiments may be reversed, in conformity with expectations regarding the sovereignty of central state institutions, in political reality devolution is probably irreversible, rendering the notion of 'sovereignty' a complex and elusive one. This is particularly the case in relation to Northern Ireland, which successive UK governments have committed themselves to handing over to a 'foreign' jurisdiction, should a majority there so wish.
The changing British-Irish relationship goes well beyond international agreements and adhoc arrangements. To an increasing degree it has been evolving under the umbrella of a complex, new institutional structure, extending also to the component parts of the UK and to its dependencies. This umbrella, described by John Coakley, may be so slight as to be scarcely noticeable; but it possesses considerable capacity for growth. One strand, a bilat- But technical developments, including the advent of digital terrestrial TV and increased availability of cable and satellite television, together with increased political willingness on the part of the UK authorities to accept this, finally removed physical barriers to cross-border reception, ushering in more profound all-island patterns of reception and viewing.
The second set of developments that have indirect implications for political relationships is that of cross-border trade and investment. Katy Hayward and Eoin Magennis analyse the manner in which this economic relationship has changed over the past four decades. On the one hand, there has been a tendency for the Republic of Ireland to achieve great diversity in its export and import markets, while, proportionally, Northern Ireland continues to engage in a considerable volume of trade with the South. The border has had a big impact on economic relationships between the two jurisdictions, and has been targeted by external bodies such as the EU and the International Fund for Ireland, which have consciously sought to break down barriers by promoting more cross-border trade and investment, and have done so with some success. But much of the improvement in cross-border economic relationships, itself likely to contribute to the peace-building process, was conducted for normal commercial and business reasons, not specifically as a contribution to peace, or with political objectives in mind.
The volume adds to the literature, discussed above, on the two states' involvement in efforts to resolve the Northern Ireland problem and to ensure the stability of the settlement. The new collection of essays fills gaps in the literature and brings up to date earlier studies. Its broader focus is on slow-moving changes with big impact in Northern Ireland: changes to British state practices of territorial management, notions of sovereignty, to Irish state strategies and to intergovernmental cooperation; to the institutions and linkages slowly brought into being in conjunction with these changes,from British-Irish institutions to North-South linkages in business or broadcasting; and in the ways these are understood in Northern Ireland itself, in the big changes in republican political strategy. The articles are distinctive too in drawing on new data sources which reveal British and Irish elite perspectives on these issues. This is the matter to which we now turn.
Data sources
As it has been observed, 'methods are no more than ways of acquiring data' (Della Porta and But each of these approaches to data collection is also limited in its usefulness. The early literature on elite interviewing (such as Dexter, 1970) has been supplemented by a growing body of literature on this particular methodology (for example, Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987; Arksey and Knight, 1999; Rice, 2010; and Bryson and McConville, 2014) . One consideration that the researcher needs to bear in mind is the fact that elites do not always know, recall, remember accurately or wish to reveal information about the past, and they do not have privileged insight into causal processes. They may not have (or be willing to reveal) insight into their own past motivations, and they may forget or conceal the manner in which institutions functioned in practice, and how decisions were actually made. However, interviews and witness seminars remain among the best sources for accessing the conceptual frameworks and perspectives of elites, permitting in-depth questioning, and allowing comparisons over time and between respondents. They also give us one of the very few available windows into the practical functioning of state institutions. Of course, they need to be used alongside other sources, and they need to be checked both against each other and against independently sourced data. With these provisos, they are of irreplaceable value.
A central data source for most of the articles in this volume is the John Whyte Archive created by the Institute for British Irish Studies at University College Dublin. This is a collection of taped and transcribed elite interviews and witness seminars dealing with the process of 
The 'Breaking Patterns of Conflict' project
The interview and other oral material on which we draw so heavily in this volume was col- what their role had been on a day to day level -how events had unfolded, and how they had understood the process. This was particularly important in respect of the Irish civil service, where there is no tradition of the publication of memoirs. Our objective was to create a historical resource, which would in the short term serve as background, unattributable information for the researchers involved, but which will in the longer term be opened to researchers.
At the very outset, researchers in projects of this kind face the challenge of negotiating access to politicians and officials, especially as many of the individuals we wished to interview had held high office (see Dexter, 1970: 28-36) . Participation by senior Irish officials was opened up after the late Dermot Nally (former Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach, and of immense help in the project) was told by the then Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, to participate because 'this is history'. Shortly thereafter, British officials and politicians also began to participate. We travelled to London to interview the latter, and occasionally to mainland Europe to interview diplomats. We are greatly indebted to these respondents, who so graciously put considerable time aside for us. In almost all cases, we believe that the respondents saw the value of this initiative both as a research project, and as a means of eventually putting on the record their perceptions of an important historical process in which they had played a role.
Of course, coverage of so large a field can never be comprehensive, given the necessarily limited financial and personnel resources available. In addition, some important figures were too ill, or too busy, to be interviewed. Yet, we managed to generate a more extensive data set than exists elsewhere, to our knowledge. It comprises interviews with over 90 officials and politicians (from Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the USA) involved in negotiations from 1973 to 2010. In addition, we conducted six day-long witness seminars, bringing together between four and eight respondents who had participated in major setpiece British-Irish negotiations or (in the case of the last two seminars) business linkages and peace-related activity. The participants, discussed the processes that were involved, and the manner in which they understood them, with a number of academic questioners. These witness seminars involved the participation of a further 40 respondents. autobiographies, if any, and acquainting themselves with their career paths. This is sometimes said to be necessary to create a level of 'symmetry' between interviewer and respondent (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 122-125) . In our case, the issue was not symmetry, but rather the capacity to engage the respondents in informed reflective discussion -and sometimes intellectual discussion of the events in which they had participated (Rice, 2010: 74) .
Occasionally the respondent quizzed the interviewer on his or her 'credentials' and politics;
we made it clear that we were researchers, not involved in the political aspects of the process. Often we were clear (and honest) in our view that the British-Irish process had made a very positive impact on resolving the conflict, and that we wanted to understand it better.
The interviews focussed on the part that the individuals had played in the processes of negotiation: we asked them about what they had done, and how they had thought about it and understood it at the time and later (Dexter, 1970: 115-6 ). This was not investigative reporting: if the respondents were determined not to tell us something, we moved to another topic.
. Interviews were semi-structured with questions covering the main periods when the respondent worked on British-Irish relations and probing specific issues known to be contentious. Questions were decided in team discussion prior to the interview, with interviewer discretion in following leads in the interview itself. We did not try fully to define the issues or questions (Dexter, 1970: 5-6 ), but rather let the respondents themselves -as the expertscorrect us where necessary and define what they saw as the most important parts of the process of negotiation, policy-making or implementation. We followed their discussions, with our questions focussing on meaning and understanding as much as on facts. Some interviews ran into several hours. Occasionally it was clear that the one or two hours allowed were insufficient to cover the process, and respondent and interviewer agreed to meet again in a few weeks to continue the discussion. The interviews were taped, by agreement.
The witness seminars took a parallel form. Considerable prior research was undertaken by the interviewers, and a schedule for the day was drawn up, to ensure coverage of all aspects of the topic in question. The first four witness seminars addressed defining moments in the with the eventual transcription. An academic chair was designated, and was usually changed for morning and afternoon sessions to keep discussion moving, and to ensure that important issues were not ignored: it was neither easy nor indeed always appropriate to impose 'order' on talkative and engaged senior politicians and civil servants. Discussion continued over coffee and lunch. This could not be recorded, but important issues raised in informal discussion during breaks were brought up again in the afternoon session by the academic questioners.
The proceedings of the witness seminars and the content of the interviews were transcribed, except in the very few cases where the respondent wanted the tapes rather than a transcription to be lodged in the archive. Following correction and editing of the transcripts, respondents approved a final version, sometimes making quite extensive additions and changes.
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Interviewees imposed embargos of varying length on the transcripts and tapes, and agreed that, in the interim, the information contained there could be used as background information by the research team.
Until the various embargos expire, then, the interviews and witness seminars are used only in accordance with a form of the 'Chatham House rule'. 8 When this material is used in the articles that follow, then, phrases quoted should be seen as close paraphrases (put in quotation marks to capture accurately the tone of response), and are not attributed. The only interviews which are attributed in the articles that follow were either conducted by the author of the article, who was given permission to use them, or, in the case of interviews that form part of this archive, the author got written permission from the respondent to attribute the quotation.
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Conclusion
The articles in this special issue will show, then, the value of the oral archive described above for our understanding of the negotiation process that transformed the relationship between the British and Irish states. At the very least, the interviews and witness seminars give us clarity about the everyday processes involved in negotiations and implementation processes, and the informal interactions that made a difference to the outcomes. As a whole, they do more: they show competing and changing perspectives on events, differences in the Irish and British perspectives, and they challenge us to come to terms with the multiple per-spectives on continuity and change expressed differentially from British and Irish perspectives.
The essays in this volume, then, shed further light on the remarkable change in the BritishIrish relationship that took place around the turn of the century. The 'historic compromise'
represented by the Good Friday Agreement was made possible by a long-term shift in British and Irish state priorities. This is not to argue that the two governments, in the words of Taras and Ganguly cited above, were motivated by 'selfless commitment' to the pursuit of peace.
As in all such contexts, the sovereign governments had their own preoccupations and interests. As the articles assembled here show, however, and as the oral archive data illustrates, sufficient convergence of interest had occurred by the end of the twentieth century for each side to favour the radical new initiatives that, at least so far, have substantially brought an end to one of Europe's most bitter geopolitical disputes.
tion of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed'; see www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule.
9.
In such cases, the full date of the interview is not given, to prevent cross-checking with other articles prior to the lifting of the embargo on the interviews.
